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1. Introduction
Electricity sectors across the globe have experienced a major experiment of introducing
market-oriented reforms and restructuring in response to a combination of political,
ideological, economic and technological factors starting in the early 1980s and gaining pace
since the 1990s. The reforms aimed at introducing energy policies, legislation, regulations and
institutions that would dismantle the monopoly of state-owned utilities and provide
opportunities for private actors to participate in a competitive market (Ljung, 2007). Moreover,
market driven economic reforms are ongoing in many countries although the pace of the reform
process has varied across countries. For example, by the end of the 1990s, the majority of
OECD countries and over 70 developing and transition countries had taken some steps toward
reforming their electricity sector through high and low level measures (Besant-Jones, 2006).
The high level reform measures focussed on introducing competition in the wholesale and retail
segments of energy supply, the horizontal unbundling of the incumbents to create viable
competitors, the creation of an independent regulatory body and often (but not necessarily
always) privatization. These measures allowed the corporatization of the different segments of
the energy supply and also facilitated the vertical separation between the natural monopolies
and the potentially competitive segments of the vertically integrated energy sectors that were
monolithically owned and managed by state governments before reforms. Vertical separation
of these distinct activities of the energy supply industry (ESI) was believed to guard against
cross-subsidization between the competitive businesses and regulated businesses of energy
supply and discriminatory practices such as denial of access to networks (Joskow, 2006). The
degree of vertical separation (or unbundling) varied in terms of functional separation,
accounting separation, legal separation and ownership separation. The low level reform
measures included aspects of cost-reflective pricing (such as removal of subsidies and subsidies
restructuring, tariff liberalisation and price setting), adoption of new energy technology, new
financial schemes and community involvement (Prasad, 2008).
Thus, a successful electricity reform is expected to enhance the efficiency of the sector,
improve energy service reliability and service quality, reduce the price-cost gap through costreflective pricing and increase investments (Newbery, 2002; Jamasb, 2006; Kessides, 2012).
Successful power sector reform were expected to benefit the poor by providing access to energy
services, improvements in cost efficiency, improvements in other services such as health,
education and communications; and stimulation of economic development and improvements
in public sector finances (Davies et al., 2003). A key question is the extent to which these goals
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have been achieved considering that ample amounts of financial resources and effort have
already been used in the reforming countries.
Answering this question requires revisiting the theoretical rationale and examining the
empirical evidence of power sector reforms against their anticipated objectives. However, a
comprehensive analysis of the impacts of power sector reforms on several sector specific and
macroeconomic dimensions including energy prices, energy supply quality, utility
performance, economic growth, social welfare and poverty reduction is missing in the existing
energy reform literature. On the other hand, there has been a renewed interest in the
relationships between power sector reforms, efficiency, growth, and welfare in the light of
climate change and energy security concerns (Nepal and Jamasb, 2015). For example, the UK,
one of the pioneers of market-based reforms, proposed a new electricity market reform in 2010
signalling the desire for more government intervention in order to meet its ambitious climate
change objectives (DECC, 2011). The renationalization of electricity industries in Latin
American countries such as Bolivia, República Bolivariana de Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic has underscored the changing but significant role of the state in market-based reforms
(Balza et al., 2013). For example, Argentina, once at the forefront of reform, is now curbing
the role of markets in the energy sector (Littlechild, 2013).
Nearly 30 years since the first power sector reform in Chile, it is timely to take stock of the
cumulative reform experience with market-based reforms of this important and ongoing
experiment. The reforms have proven much more difficult than first anticipated and most
remain work in progress. This paper also attempts to close the gaps in the electricity reform
literature by reviewing the process and micro-macro outcomes of power sector liberalisation
and reform and synthesizes relevant policy lessons for policymakers in (re) formulating the
(existing) new power sector reforms and policies. An earlier study by Jamasb et al. (2005)
reviewed empirical evidence on electricity reform in developing countries by focussing on the
operating efficiency and electricity access impacts. However, we have considered both
empirical and theoretical literature on the linkages between electricity sector reforms;
economic and technical efficiency, economic growth, welfare and poverty reduction in
developing countries. In doing so, this paper aims to measure reform performance, clearly
explore the link between the theory and practice of electricity reforms filling an important gap
in the existing literature and reach rigid conclusions on the performance of reforms from a
policymaking perspective. We do not examine the impact of reforms on the environment. It
suffices to state that reforms may or may not have negative environmental impacts. However,
3

this is rather a matter of devising proper environmental policies and is, therefore, separate from
the reforms per se.1
The remainder of the sections are structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the
drives, context and status of electricity reforms around the world. Section 3 discusses the
different methodological approaches to studying the impacts of reforms and analyse the
impacts of energy sector reforms on several industry specific and macroeconomic dimensions.
Section 4 synthesizes the insights from the reforms and policy lessons. Section 5 concludes the
paper.

2. Overview: Drivers, Context and Status of Reforms
Electricity sector reforms based on the ‘standard textbook model’ became a global trend during
the 1990s. The textbook model was first applied in the Chilean power sector in 1982 and also
became the reference model for reforms in other energy sectors. The textbook model for
reforms involved the following reform sequence and steps: i) corporatization of state-owned
enterprise, ii) law for electricity sector liberalization, iii) establishment of an independent
regulator, iv) unbundling (vertical separation) of the main segments, v) incentive regulation of
electricity networks, vi) establishment of a wholesale electricity market, vii) privatization and
viii) introduction of independent power producers (IPPs). The model brought about a
fundamental paradigm shift in terms of electricity sector market structures, the role of the state,
and the regulation of the sector (Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002).
The structures of electricity markets have a strong influence on whether and the extent to which
reforms can achieve improvements in performance. Creating competitive wholesale and retail
electricity markets by undertaking vertical separation were the eventual underlying aims behind
market restructuring. Competition inevitably meant a reduction in state ownership, as private
sector could freely participate in wholesale markets and take market share from incumbents
(Pollitt, 2012). The reforms were aimed at expanding the scope for competition in the
electricity sector either through ‘competition in the market’ or ‘competition for the market’
(Ljung, 2007). Hence, both domestic private firms and multinational corporations could
participate as market actors. As a result, there was a strong push for privatisation and models

1
A notable study by ESMAP (2011) shows that vertical unbundling tends to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by
5 percent indicating a higher degree of environmental sustainability.
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of private sector participation such as the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the
electricity sector (Vagliasindi, 2013).
The market-oriented reforms were followed by the need to create strong and effective new
institutions in the form of independent electricity sector regulatory agencies. The separation of
the natural monopoly segments of electricity supply from the competitive segments and
privatisation placed much emphasis on economic regulation to ensure that public interests were
properly reflected in terms of service quality, network access and tariffs while all generators
had equitable access to the grid and consumers. The perverse incentives created by the cost-ofservice regulation in terms gold-plated spending (see Averch and Johnson, 1962) implied that
incentive regulation was encouraged to improve cost efficiency in electricity networks. It was
assumed that incentive regulation of the monopoly electricity networks would mimic the
outcomes of a competitive market (Littlechild, 1992).
Table 1 summarizes the drivers that contributed to the adoption of liberalised electricity
reforms in developed and developing countries. The specific motives for reforms often varied
between developing and developed countries while external drivers (factors outside the sector)
played a key role in shaping electricity sector reforms. Poor operational and financial
performance of the state led utilities; technological progress and development of the highly
efficient gas-fired combined coal gas turbines (CCGTs); political faith on the forces of market,
competition and privatization; pressures from international donor agencies; options for raising
capital to the government and alongside reducing its Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
(PSBR) were some of the major drivers of reforms (see Jamasb, Nepal, Timilsina and Toman,
2014).2
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For example, the World Bank officially changed its lending policy in 1992 and later followed by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) for electricity development from traditional project lending to policy
lending. Almost $US 187 billion of private capital flowed into the economy of 76 developing countries during the
1990s (Beder, 2005). Privatization of state owned energy utilities reinforced the ideology of the Thatcher
government and its interest in reducing the costs of domestic coal subsidies in the UK while similar ideological
and political explanations can be found in Chile, Norway and New Zealand (Newbery, 2002; Hogan, 2002).
Technological progress eliminated the significant entry barriers that had previously existed to entry in power
generation and intensified competition in electricity generation. Likewise, Bolivia including other Latin American
countries (LACs), Ghana and the transition economies (which includes the countries belonging to the former
Soviet Union) are examples of energy sector privatization in the context of large debt crisis. Interestingly,
privatisation in the LACs proceeded at such a speed that they contributed to about 40% of the total value of energy
privatizations in the world during the 1990s (Gabriele, 2004).
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Table 1: Drivers of electricity sector reforms
Electricity sector drivers
External drivers

Developed countries:
excess capacity, use of costly generation
technologies, economic inefficiency,
growing consumer demands for cheap
energy
Developing countries:
Lack of public sector financial resources
to meet growing demand, institutional
inefficiency, burden of energy subsidies,
low service quality, high energy losses,
poor service coverage, capacity shortage
and energy sector investment constraints

a) Political and economic ideology: faith on the
forces of market, competition and privatization
b) Technological innovation: such as the
development of CCGTs
c) Macroeconomic events: such as the post-Soviet
economic transition (1989), Latin American debt
crisis (1980s), Asian financial crisis (1997-1998)
d) Capital raising options: privatization of state
owned energy assets
e) OECD energy deregulation: creation of new
energy multinationals looking for new investment
opportunities
f) Lending policies of donors: such as those of the
World Bank and IMF with strings attached
g) National economic reform context: as a result of
economic crisis and structural adjustment
programs

However, the sector’s resource endowment, initial structure, size, and institutional strength
differed across the reforming countries. Also, the design, scope, and implementation of reforms
varied across countries. Inevitably, these factors came to play an important role in the extent
of adoption and performance of market-oriented reforms. These conditions proved critical in
determining the appropriate design and pace of sector reform for a country (World Bank, 2004).
The initial sector structure defines the starting point of the reform process and is a given factor
implying the importance of envisaging appropriate structure from the start of the reform
process. The institutional factors refer to sector and economy level legal and regulatory
framework that influence and support the continuity of the electricity sector reform process.
The reforms and regulation of the electricity sector in developing countries tend to suffer from
low levels of institutional environment in terms of limited regulatory capacity, limited
accountability, limited commitment and limited fiscal efficiency (Laffont, 2005). The weak
institutional environment implies that reforms and regulation of the sector can be ineffective.
Regulation (predominantly cost-based) can also be prone to political capture and becoming a
tool of self-interest within the government or ruling elite in developing countries (Stiglitz,
6

1998). However, regulation by contract or a combination of regulation by contract and
regulatory independence may provide a better regulatory framework for developing countries
aiming to privatize their distribution systems (Bakovic, Tenenbaum, and Woolf, 2003). The
size of the electricity sector can influence the reform capabilities and reform options of
individual reforming countries. It is not clear if the smaller energy systems in developing
countries require or benefit from vertical separation and third-party access. For example, the
scope for competition may be limited implying that, in small energy systems; the benefits of
liberalization and reforms may be small in relation to the costs.
Despite these notable differences, electricity sector reforms have been globally pursued under
varying initial conditions. Some have had relative success while many have not lived up to the
ambitions and expectations after more than two decades of reforms. For example, existing
market driven reforms among OECD countries like Chile, Norway and Sweden appears to be
performing well as compared to the UK, once considered as a successful model of electricity
reforms. In contrast, the inability to attract private investments in the power sector in SubSaharan African countries like Uganda and Zambia remains a disappointment. According to
the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, there was a boom in IPPs
during the 1990s, which subsequently abated with the arrival of the financial crisis in the late
1990s.

Reforms seem to have failed to correct the chronic underinvestment in power supply in most
developing and transition countries, which also accounts for the poor performance of the sector
in these countries. For example, there was very little investment in the power sector from 1991
to at least the mid-2000s except for the Russian Federation and Turkey in the European and
Central Asian countries (Barbara, 2010). Some countries (such as in Latin America) have made
relatively advanced transition to the market in the energy sector while some (such as China,
Russia, South Africa) are caught between the state and the market where the state still plays a
dominant role in electricity sector operation and management (Nepal, 2013). Table 2
summarizes the power sector reform experience among selected cases in a power sector reform
matrix.
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Table 2: Reform status of electricity sector in selected countries
Country

India

Primary
factors for
reform
economic
openness to
foreign
investment,
poor
performance of
state-owned
electric utilities

Thailand supply
shortages,
government’s
massive debt,
Asian financial
crisis

Ghana

supply
shortages,
external
lending policy,
fiscal crisis,
lack of
investment,
poorly
performing
distribution
sector

Fiji

fiscal
problems,

Key milestones of
the reform process

Main outcomes

Limitation/
Challenges

IPP entry in 1991,
introduction of
independent
regulation act (at
state level) was
passed in 1998,
Electricity Reform
Act enacted in
2003

all states (29) have
constituted and operated an
independent regulator
while 23 states have
undertaken tariff reform,
20 states have implemented
unbundling/corporatization,
2 states (Orissa and Delhi)
have privatised
distribution, 28 states have
implemented third party
access and 11 states have
exercised multi-year
distribution tariff orders

1992 Electricity
Law, IPP Law
1996, approval of
independent
regulator
establishment in
1999,
abandonment of
price based pool in
2003, privatisation
postponement in
2004,
establishment of
energy regulatory
board in 2008
World Bank
requires reform as
loan conditions in
1994, 1997
restructuring and
privatization plan,
regulator formed,
IPPs introduced in
1998, reforms
shelved by
parliament in 2001,
Volta River
Authority (VRA)
unbundled in 2008

electricity market reforms
remain inactive,
uneconomic tariff structure
which is disadvantageous
to consumers, regulation ad
incentive schemes do not
promote efficiency but
favour the state enterprises

success of
reform not
encouraging,
questionable
outcomes base d
on competition
and
privatisation,
technical losses
above 35% of
power
generation,
power theft ongoing, statelevel corruption,
subsidised
tariffs
political turmoil
affecting reform
implementation,
regulatory
institutions
remain weak
and not
independent,
state enterprises
are favoured,
promoting
market
competition
difficult

1996 Public
Enterprise Act,
functional

productivity improvements,
system losses reduced from
18% to 10%, tariff
8

reforms stalled, structure of
the sector has not changed
much, VRA mostly
operating under financial
losses, distribution losses
remain high, tariff setting
not economic and eroding
the long term viability of
utilities

regulator not
independent
from political
interference, no
standard form of
PPA in the
market,
competing
pressures to
keep consumer
tariffs low
hampering the
establishment of
cost-reflective
tariff
regulator unable
to make
independent

donors lending
policy

separation in 1998,
internal reform
again started in
2002, tariffs
increase by
independent
regulator in 2005

collection rates increased,
more authority and
discretion to independent
regulators

Brazil

poor
performance of
state-owned
utilities,
demonstrations
effects from
Chile and
Argentina

launched radical
electricity sector
reforms in 1996,
privatisation began
in 1995, creation of
independent
regulators in 1998,
short term
wholesale market
created between
1995 and 2003,
long term contracts
model replaced the
previous wholesale
market between
2004 and 2005

increasing reverting to
central planning,
competition has improved
in the sector, auction
process in transmission
provide competition and
incentives for investors,
distribution companies
procure electricity at
competitive price

China

electricity
reforms
pursued as a
part of wider
liberal
economic
reforms

overall reforms postponed,
industry restructuring not
accompanied by the
introduction of competitive
markets, entrenched
interests have obstructed
further reform, generating
capacity doubled between
2002 and 2007

Russia

electricity
reforms
pursued as a
part of wider
liberal
economic
reforms after

corporatisation and
commercialisation
of sector in 1998,
1999 bidding by
power generators,
separation of
generation from
transmission and
distribution in
2002, creation of
state electricity
regulatory
commission in
2002, scheme for
power price reform
in 2003
establishment of
joint stock
company for
electricity in 1992,
reform principles
adopted in 2001,
regulatory
framework of the
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reforms stalled, lack of
insufficient investments for
system modernization and
low carbon generation
capacity, electricity pricing
controlled by government
for social equity concerns

decisions on
tariff setting,,,
unstable
political
environment can
lead to low
private sector
involvement
excessive
reliance on
hydro can lead
to energy crisis
in the face of
rising demand as
in 2001-2002,
decarbonisation
a challenge
when addressing
issues associated
with security of
supply and
diversity in
generation,
attracting
private
investments a
necessary
condition for the
growth of the
sector
future of power
sector reform
uncertain,
political will be
important in
moving forward
with stalled
reforms,
institutions such
as legal system
and capital
markets remain
immature to
support
competitive
markets
blackouts in
2002
highlighted
fragility of the
system,
destruction of
hydropower
plant in 2008

Soviet-Union
break up

South
Africa

democratic
revolution of
1994, poor
performance of
state-owned
utilities, new
international
thinking

reform established
in 2003, gradual
transition towards
free market pricing
in 2003,
privatisation of
quasi- monopolist
in 2008, free
market pricing in
theory in 2011
creation of an
independent
regulator in 1995,
White Paper on
Energy Policy
published in 1998,
announcement of
no unbundling of
the incumbent in
2004, White Paper
on renewable
energy published
in 2003

highlighted the
need for system
modernisation,
market pricing
only in theory as
government
actively
monitors
electricity prices
overall reluctance to
reform, post 1990
performance saw some
improvements in quality
and security of supply,
rapid progress in extending
electricity access, prices
still low by international
standards and below costrecovery levels

urgent need for
capacity
expansion as
capacity is tight,
pricing
principles of
efficiency and
cost-reflectivity
necessary,
transparency in
subsidy
programme
needed

The single-buyer model dominates most of the electricity sectors in Asia, Africa and some
transition countries as observed in Table 3. The single buyer model is perceived to be a
reasonable second-best solution in countries where the competitive model would not work
(Arizu, Gencer and Maurer, 2006). In contrast, most of the countries in Latin America have
competitive wholesale arrangements and considerable reforms have been carried out with
adherence to the standard reform model. The generation segment of the ESI has undergone
privatization in many developing countries while the network segments remain publicly
owned. The privatisation of the ESI has been largely pursued in Latin America while IPPs now
occupy a large market in Asia, particularly in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Pakistan,
Malaysia and Thailand under a single-buyer model. Overall, many developing countries are
still some distance away from the full adoption of liberalized standard model in their power
sector and are by and large in transition from state control to markets.
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Table 3: Power Sector Reform Matrix

Cameroon, Côte
d’Ivoire, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Peru, Nicaragua,
Colombia, Russia,
Lithuania

transmission

Philippines, Pakistan,
Cameroon, Uganda,
Côte d’Ivoire,
Morocco, Chile,
Brazil, Peru,
Argentina, Bolivia,
Nicaragua, Colombia,

distribution

11

generation

monolithic single buyer

Korea Rep.,
Cameroon,
Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan,
Azerbaijan,
Kyrgyzstan

unbundled single
buyer

Malaysia, Philippines,
Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Ghana, Uganda,
Kenya, Turkey,
Lithuania

China, Malaysia,
Philippines, Thailand,
Vietnam, Nepal,
Lithuania, Turkey,
Russia, Nicaragua,
Colombia, Bolivia,
Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, Chile, Tunisia,
Morocco, Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Côte
d’Ivoire, Uganda,
Nigeria, Ghana,
Cameroon,
Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, India, Pakistan

monopoly

China, Thailand,
Vietnam, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Burkina Faso,
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire,
Zimbabwe, Senegal,
Morocco, Tunisia

Involvement

Regulation

Malaysia,
Philippines,
Thailand, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal
Cameroon, Nigeria,
Uganda, Côte
d’Ivoire, Senegal,
Kenya, Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Peru,
Brazil, Nicaragua,
Colombia, Russia,
Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Kyrgyzstan

independent regulators exists

Private Ownership and

Market Structure

wholesale
competition

Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru,
Nicaragua, Russia

Russia, Lithuania,
Turkey, Azerbaijan

Source: Ljung (2007) and authors' compilation

3. Assessing the Reform Impacts
Several approaches have been used in the literature to assess impacts of energy sector,
particularly, power sector reforms. These include social cost-benefit analysis, econometric
analysis, efficiency and productivity analysis, macroeconomic analysis and specific case
studies.
A social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) in principle considers energy reforms and restructuring
as an investment and compares the costs of investment with the benefit which is the change in
actual and projected performance relative to a defined counterfactual of what would have
happened in the absence of reforms and restructuring (Jones et al., 1990). Hence, a SCBA is
expected to estimate the overall welfare impact of energy sector reforms and the distribution
of welfare. However, governments do not necessarily perform social-cost benefit analysis prior
to reform and tend to rely on less formal types of assessment (Jamasb, Newbery and Pollitt,
2005). Moreover, energy sector reforms are multi-dimensional activities with many interacting
factors, which cannot be captured by a SCBA.
Econometric analysis is used to test hypothesis through statistical analysis of reform
determinants and performance thereby quantifying the effect of various reforms on the energy
sector performance indicators. Performance metric regressions based on cross-section, panel
data econometrics and time-series econometrics are applied for this purpose. Statistical tests to
assess the significant differences in the performance metrics before and after reforms are often
carried out by conducting a t-test. However, a t-test for significant performance differences
cannot control for the effects of other variables as in a multivariable regression analysis.
Efficiency and productivity analyses are desirable for assessing the effectiveness to transform
inputs into outputs, relative to best practice. Both parametric and non-parametric methods are
used in measuring productivity and efficiency. Parametric methods use specified production or
cost functional forms and apply econometric techniques. Typical parametric methods include
regression analysis and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). In contrary, non-parametric methods
12

use mathematical programming techniques and do not require specification of production or
cost functions. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a commonly used non-parametric method
that evaluates the performance of an agent relative to the frontier. Frontier methodologies
measure efficiency as the distance to the frontier by constructing a cost or production function.
Therefore, each individual agent is benchmarked against the best practice, also known as
benchmarking (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2000). Efficiency and productivity analysis also reduce the
need for rigorous data and especially when the data are hard to collect.
Macroeconomic analysis use macroeconomic models, such as computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models to assess the quantitative impacts of energy reforms on the economy. The CGE
models use actual economic data to estimate how an economy might react to changes in policy,
technology or other external factors pertaining to energy reforms. The advantage of the reform
studies based on CGE modelling is that these studies attempt to model the interaction effects
of sector reform with non-reforming sectors and calculate the aggregate welfare effect directly.
Single or multi-country case studies are desirable when in-depth investigation or qualitative
analysis is needed. These studies are useful when qualitative aspects of reforms such as
regulation and conflict resolution and reform dynamics such as the implementation process are
crucial factors in assessing the efficacy of the reforms (Jamasb et al., 2005). This is because
these factors are inherently difficult to capture through statistical methods. Case studies can
examine issues that do not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or could not
be analysed due to a lack of comprehensive data (Jamasb, Newbery and Pollitt, 2005). Hence,
case studies can overcome the issues associated with model specification and accuracy of
variables in representing the relevant aspect of reform. Case studies involving single or
multiple countries have been a popular technique to study the process and outcomes of energy
sector reforms in many developing and developed countries.
Market-oriented electricity reforms, when implemented properly, should engender positive
impacts on efficiency and other performance measures of the energy industry with desirable
macroeconomic consequences. Reforms are expected to lead to cost-reflective energy pricing
and the curtailment of energy subsidies while reducing the margins between price and cost (i.e.
reducing the scope for market power abuse and exercise). Reforms should also enhance the
technical, operational (including improved access to energy) and economic efficiency of the
sector. The importance of energy as a production input and necessary final consumption good
imply that energy reforms should be conducive towards economic growth and poverty
reduction. Hence, the impacts of energy sector reforms can be studied as industry specific
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impacts

(encompassing

energy

prices/subsidies

and

technical/economic/operational

efficiency) and macroeconomic impacts (economic growth, poverty reduction, welfare
enhancement).

3.1. Microeconomic Impacts of Electricity Sector Reforms
This section reviews the relevant literature analyzing the impacts of energy sector reforms on
several dimensions pertaining to the microeconomics of electricity industry including
electricity pricing, economic efficiency and electricity service quality (e.g., reliability). As
energy sector reforms are market-driven they rely on competition and price signals, reforms
are expected to lower electricity costs and retail prices while improving the overall efficiency
of the sector (Joskow, 1998). It is noteworthy that in developing countries removal of subsidies,
a source of inefficiency, will result in increased prices. In this section we present evidence of
meeting (or not meeting) this objective of the energy sector reforms.

3.1.1. Impacts of reforms on electricity pricing
Electricity reforms are expected to establish the primacy of pricing mechanism in the electricity
industry by fostering competition and leading to improved efficiency and lower energy prices
(Yang and Sharma, 2012). Reforms would encourage entry of new actors in energy markets by
providing better incentives so that new entrants with more efficient technologies would create
downward pressure on energy prices (Fan, 2007). Hence, sector reforms are expected to lead
to lower electricity price-cost margins cost-reflective pricing move electricity prices towards
their long-run marginal costs (LRMC).
However, there is no clear consensus regarding the evidence of reforms on energy price impacts
in developing countries. The global evidence suggests that privatisation did not lower costs in
the short run for the industry once allowance was made for ownership while government
interference with investments decisions led to increased costs (Pollitt, 1995). Moreover, the
evidence varies across different developing regions while the impacts of different reform steps
on energy prices also differ. Three studies by Nagayama (2007; 2009) and Erdogdu (2011) are
of notable importance in assessing the reform impacts on prices at the global level. For
example, Nagayama (2007) show that the introduction of foreign IPPs, privatization and
introducing retail competition lowered electricity prices in some regions and not all developing
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countries they studied. Regulatory institutions in developing countries are often found to be
not independent implying that political interference prevents energy prices from being-cost
reflective. Country level corruption on contracts granted to the IPPs also prevented the reforms
from producing their intended effects in developing countries such as in Southeast Asia (Henisz
and Zelner, 2002). On the other hand, a study by ESMAP (2011) shows that vertical unbundling
decreased electricity tariffs by 10% indicating a higher degree of competitiveness in developing
countries.
Nagayama (2009) shows that cross-subsidies in electricity pricing declined with the progress
in the electricity sector liberalization in Asian developing countries although liberalization
models do not necessarily reduce average electricity prices. In Latin America, the impact of
liberalization on electricity prices is mixed. The wholesale and retail prices have often risen
due to unbundling and privatization in order to assure return in investment expected by private
investors.
The effects of reforms on electricity price cost-margin (i.e. the difference between electricity
price and cost) and cross subsidy levels can be different between industrial and residential
consumers across both developing and developed countries. Participation of IPPs in the
generation market and existence of wholesale markets seems to decrease industrial price-cost
margin in Latin American countries (Erdogdu, 2011). Likewise, the establishment of wholesale
electricity markets and a market regulator had a downward effect on the residential price-cost
margins in developing countries. Unbundling an inherent element of the textbook reform
model), with privatization, also led to a decreasing effect on residential price-cost margins in
the developing countries in the Latin America. These evidence shows that each of the main
reform steps can produce diverse impacts on the price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels
across different countries. On the other hand, the overall impacts of reforms on the industrial
and residential price of electricity depend on the level of industry restructuring.
The impact of reforms on electricity prices has been less frequently studied on a regional basis
and the focus of most research to date has been at the utility level. India provides an interesting
case to assess the differences in regional outcomes of reforms considering the different states
sharing a common economic and political system. Sen and Jamasb (2012) analyze the impacts
of individual reform measures on key economic and power sector variables for different Indian
states and showed that the average price of electricity was unaffected by reforms while passing
of tariff order in different states as a mechanism to correct price distortions significantly
lowered the industrial price of electricity. Tariff order also rationalized electricity pricing by
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lowering the cross-subsidies between industrial and residential customers while unbundling
lowered the cross-subsidy between industrial and agricultural customers. In Orissa, the average
electricity tariff increased from 1991 to 2001 (Kundu and Mishra, 2011). However, the price
of electricity sharply increased particularly for agricultural customers after reforms due to the
abolishment of government subsidies. These studies confirm that reform outcomes in
developing countries can be adverse during the initial stages of reforms.
In Latin America, the change in regulatory regime from cost-based to price-caps did not
produce clear pattern of electricity price development although the changes in ownership and
regulatory regime in the electricity distribution sector led to a decline in the retail price in
general (Estache and Rossi, 2005). The price fall, however, did not match the corresponding
productivity gains. However, a recent study by Balza, Jimenez and Mercado (2013)
documented that an increase in cumulative private investment by 1% led to a 0.015% reduction
in electricity prices across Latin America. The quality of regulation in reforming countries also
significantly reduced the electricity prices. In Peru, the restructuring and privatization of the
electricity distribution market led to price increases for consumers (Anaya, 2010). In Argentina,
the wholesale electricity prices as well as the real average tariffs fell from the 1992 levels as a
result of increased competition due to industry restructuring and privatization even though the
price froze in the wake of an economic crisis in 2002 due to the devaluation of the national
currency (Haselip and Potter, 2010). Average node prices for electricity also declined in Chile
from the 1982 levels with the implementation of reforms while prices reduced by 30% in
Argentina (Pollitt, 2004). Nonetheless, assessing the causal effect of the price fall for lowincome groups is complicated in Chile as targeted subsidies and electrification policies can also
produce the effect rather than strictly privatization (Paredes, 2001). In Colombia, prices
reduced by 20% (Ayala and Millan, 2003).
In other developing countries, the impacts of electricity reform on electricity prices are opposite
of that in Latin American countries. For example in Turkey privatization of electricity
distribution systems did not yield the expected retail price declines in the initial years of
reforms program despite the fact that wholesale tariffs exhibited a reduction (retail price
increased by 6% while wholesale price decreased by 10% (Karahan and Toptas, 2013).
Similarly, in Africa, electricity prices have been generally high before and after sector reforms.3

3
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, the average electricity tariff remained almost twice as high as in other
parts of the world regardless of whether this was before or after the reforms. The prevailing high electricity tariffs
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Reforms also had no impact on the electricity prices of South Asian countries like Bangladesh
and Pakistan where electricity prices are not cost-reflective and politically determined
(Bhattacharya, 2007). Electricity prices continue to be below the cost recovery levels giving
rise to high commercial losses among the transition countries such as Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since reforms started in the early
1990s (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a). The difficulty of the socially vulnerable consumers to absorb
further price increases (low affordability) has often prevented pursuing tariff reforms in many
transition countries (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007). In Turkey, the introduction of a tariff system
reflecting costs differently affected the production and consumer prices of electricity. The
effect on consumer prices was slightly lesser than for producer prices (Akkemik, 2011).

Table 4: Reforms and Electricity Prices
Policy impacts
Study

Approach

Region

Data

Method
and relevance

Nagayama
(2007)

econometric

global

panel data: 83
countries (26
developed);
1985-2002

ordinary
least squares,
fixed effects,
random
effects

neither unbundling
nor introduction of a
wholesale pool
market on their own
necessarily reduces
the electricity prices;
unbundling may
work to reduce prices
when coexistent with
an independent
regulator

Nagayama
(2009)

econometric

global

panel data: 78
developing,
developed and
transition
countries;
1985-2003

ordered
response,
fixed effects,
random
effects

higher electricity
price drive
liberalisation;
liberalisation models
does not necessarily
reduce electricity
price

Erdogdu
(2011)

econometric

global

panel data: 63
developed and
developing
countries,
1982-2009

fixed effects,
random
effects

no uniform pattern
for the impact of
reforms process as a
whole on price-cost
margins and crosssubsidy levels;

in these countries do not cover the full costs of electricity supply. Countries like Angola, Malawi, South Africa,
Zambia and Zimbabwe have maintained highly subsidized low prices below the cost levels (Eberhard et al. 2011).
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different impact of
different reform steps
ESMAP
(2011)

econometric

global

panel data; 20
countries with
different
system sizes

Fixed effects,
random
effects

vertical unbundling
reduced electricity
tariffs by 10 percent

Sen and
Jamasb
(2012)

econometric

India

panel data: 19
Indian states,
1991-2007

bias
corrected
fixed effects

political economy
factors giving rise to
adverse outcomes in
the initial stages of
reforms

Kundu and
Mishra
(2011)

econometric

Indian state
of Orissa

survey based
approach

partial least
squares

some consumers
group benefited
(such as industrial)
while some lost
(such as agricultural)

Estache and
Rossi (2004)

econometric

Latin
America

distribution
companies of
14 countries,

correlation

fall is prices in
general did not
match the
productivity gains

Balza,
Jimenez and
Mercado
(2013)

econometric

Latin
America

panel data: 18
countries,
1971-2010

generalised
least squares

no robust results in
terms of privatisation
and end-user-prices;
strong and robust
association between
regulatory quality
and electricity prices

Anaya
(2010)

cost-benefit
analysis

Peru

electricity
distribution
companies
(privatised and
non privatised)

single
country

privatisation
contributed to price
increase

Haselip and
case study
Potter (2010)

Argentina

power sector
indicators

single
country

reforms led to price
decline until
macroeconomic
crisis

Pollitt
(2004)

case study

Chile

power sector
indicators

single
country

average node prices
declined after
reforms

Karahan and
Toptas
(2013)

case study

Turkey

power sector
indicators

single
country

no reduction in retail
electricity prices
after reforms
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Eberhard et
al. (2011)

case study

Africa

power sector
indicators

multicountry

eliminating pricing
inefficiencies can
close the funding gap
in the power sector

Bhattacharya
(2007)

case study

South Asia

power sector
indicators

multicountry

reform undertaken
produced no
significant results,
electricity prices still
highly subsidised

He et al.
(2011)

macro study

China

coal and
electricity
prices

CGE
modelling

coal price increase
caused a rise in the
costs of electric
power industry while
the influence
gradually descended
with increases in coal
price

Kennedy
(2003)

case study

Transition
economies

power sector
indicators

multicountry

implementation of
reform should be
enhanced to improve
reform performance

Fankhauser
and Tepic
(2007)

case study

Transition
economies

affordability
indicators for
utilities

multi country

level of tariffs
needed for cost
recovery bear
important
affordability
consequences

Akkemik
(2011)

case study

Turkey

macro and
micro
variables with
focus on
energy
producing
sectors

single
country;
social
accounting
matrix

cost reflective
electricity tariff
affect consumers
prices slightly less
than producer prices

3.1.2. Impacts of reforms on quality of service and access
One of the principal aims in most reforming countries was to enhance the quality of energy
supply (Joskow, 1998; Briceno-Garmendia et al., 2004). Reforms were expected to enhance
energy production, lead to efficient utilisation of existing capacities and add new capacities by
attracting investments and reduce energy losses. Studies, such as Cubbin and Stern (2004,
2006), Erdogdu (2014) and Zhang et al. (2008), find that market competition and increased
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regulatory governance as result of power sector reforms have brought enhanced service
penetration, generation capacity expansion, utilization of generation capacity and reserve
margin in some developing countries.
The effects of reforms on quality and access have differed across different development regions
as showed by Nagayama (2010) based on econometric methods for panel data analysis. The
introduction of foreign IPPs when coexistent with independent regulators and unbundling on
its own increased per capita generation capacity in Asian developing countries while the
establishment of an independent regulator produced an opposite effect. The per capita
generation capacity increased among the LACs with the introduction of wholesale power
market and power exchange. The reform impacts have triggered different impacts on electricity
transmission and distribution (T&D) losses (Nagayama, 2010). The introduction of foreign
IPPs decreased T&D losses in Asian developing countries while it had the opposite effect in
Latin America along with the establishment of an independent sector regulator. The
introduction of wholesale power market increased T&D losses in Asian developing countries
as the amount of power traded increased.
On the other hand, private sector investments in the transmission and distribution networks
contributed to a decline in electricity losses in Latin America (Balza, Jimenez and Mercado,
2013). Technical and non-technical losses fell sharply from above 20% in 1992 to just above
10% in 2007 in Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). The number of minutes of supply interruption per
year fell to 2.1 in 2003 from 9.6 in 1997 in Chile while distribution losses fell from 19.8% in
1987 to 5.6% in 2003 (Pollitt, 2004). Generation capacity also increased in many LACs except
Brazil post reforms (Millan, 2005).
Reforms triggered different impacts on the plant load factor, T&D losses and gross electricity
generation among the Indian states (Sen and Jamasb, 2012). Unbundling and tariff orders had
a positive and significant effect on plant load factors. Introduction of independent regulation,
unbundling and privatisation of distribution segment contributed to increases in T&D losses.
Gross electricity generation in India increased with the introduction of the IPPs while
privatisation of the distribution segment led to decline in electricity distribution losses. The
average level of T&D losses in Sub-Saharan Africa was around 27.5% in 2009 although the
system losses substantially ranges from 14.5% in Angola to 68% in Swaziland (ESMAP, 2009).
Reforms have also been unable to reduce electricity theft in most regions of the developing
world considering that the quality of governance such as effective accountability, political
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stability, and government effectiveness and corruption control can reduce energy theft in
developing countries (Smith, 2004).
The international experience with electricity restructuring, privatisation and liberalisation has
exposed the vulnerabilities in electricity supply in various countries (Hall, 1999). For example,
the end of 1997 saw repeated power cuts in Rio de Janerio, Brazil followed by Buenos Aires,
Argentina where a 10-day blackout occurred in 1999 while India experienced one of its largest
blackouts, which affected 20 Indian states in 2012. These supply vulnerabilities coincide with
the less than anticipated increase in private investments across the electricity networks
segments (both transmission and distribution) in the electricity industries of developing
countries with the progress in reforms. In addition, the progress toward electricity sector
reforms has coincided with limited degree of government support for research and development
(R&D) activities that potentially threaten the sustainable efficiency improvements in the
electricity industries of developing countries (Erdogdu, 2013).
Electricity reforms in developing countries were often mooted with a view to increase access
across all segments of the population (Sinha, 2003). This is because the participation of the
private sector in energy production/generation provides more investment to expand the
electricity supply capacity and thus would enhance access to electricity. However, the available
evidence suggests that electricity sector reforms do not necessarily accelerate energy access.
Systematic information is also lacking to indicate an enhanced access of electricity to the poor
due to the power sector reforms (Prasad, 2008; Haanyika, 2006). For example, the Indian state
of Orissa, which underwent a deep reform program, experienced a decline in the electrification
rate after reforms (Sihag et al., 2007). The unaffordability of electricity by the poor also imply
that any reform initiatives aimed at intensifying rural electrification has little impact in
improving the energy access of the poor (Bhattacharya, 2006).
Evidence from Latin American countries suggests that private sector investments,
improvements in regulatory quality and overall institutional reforms significantly improved the
electricity coverage in the region (Balza, Jimenez and Mercado, 2013). Electricity coverage
has been a notable success in South America after reforms where the post-reform electrification
levels have considerably increased from the pre-reform levels (Kozulj and Di Sbroiavacca,
2004). For example, the post-reform electrification rates in Argentina, Peru and El Salvador
respectively increased to 95, 72 and 76% from the respective pre-reform rates of 91, 38 and
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62%. The number of households without electricity supply in Chile decreased to 14% in 2002
from 62% in 1982 after reforms (Pollitt, 2004).
Table 5: Reforms and Electricity Quality/Access
Study

Approach

Cubbin and
Stern (2004)

econometric

Cubbin and
Stern (2006)

Region

Data

Method

Policy impacts and
relevance

global

panel data: 28
developing
countries; 19802001

OLS, fixed
effects

regulatory law and
governance positively
related to higher per
capita electricity
generation and
capacity

econometric

global

panel data: 28
developing
countries; 19802001

fixed
effects,
error
correction
models

regulatory law and
governance positively
related to higher per
capita electricity
capacity controlling
for privatization and
competition

ESMAP
(2011)

econometric

global

panel data; 20
countries with
different system
sizes

fixed
effects;
random
effects

introduction of
independent
regulation escalated
access by 50 percent

Zhang,
Parker and
Kirkpatrick
(2005)

econometric

global

panel data: 25
developing
countries, 19852001

fixed
effects

independent
regulation and
competition before
privatisation
important for higher
electricity generation
and capacity

Zhang,
Parker and
Kirkpatrick
(2008)

econometric

global

panel data: 51
developing
countries, 19852000

fixed
effects

on their own
privatisation and
regulation do not lead
to obvious gains in
economic
performance

Erdogdu
(2014)

econometric

global

panel data: 55
developed and
developing
countries, 19752010

fixed
effects,
random
effects

reform progress led to
higher levels of
electricity supply selfsufficiency

Nagayama
(2010)

econometric

global

panel data: 86
developed and
developing

fixed
effects

IPPs, unbundling,
regulatory agency and
creating wholesale
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markets reduced
transmission and
distribution losses

countries, 19852006
Nepal and
Jamasb
(2012a)

econometric

Transition
economies

panel data: 27
countries, 19902010

bias
corrected
fixed
effects

power sector reform
on its own did not
produce any
significant impacts on
T&D losses

Nepal and
Jamasb
(2012b)

case study

Nepal

power sector
indicators

single
country

electricity losses in
South-Asia including
Nepal still remain
high, capacity and
power shortages
prevail

ESMAP
(2009)

case study

SubSaharan
Africa

power sector
indicators

multi
country

high number of
outages per year and
long delays with
electrical connections

Pollitt (2008)

case study

Argentina

power sector
indicators

single
country

reforms successful in
improving quality
prior to the collapse
of Argentine peso

Millan
(2005)

case study

Latin
America

power sector
indicators

multi
country

generation capacity
expanded vigorously
except in Brazil after
reforms

Smith (2004)

case
study/econo
metric

global

102 countries:
electricity
losses,
governance
indicators for
1980 and 2000

correlation/
multi
country

losses have increased
in many developing
countries after
reforms

Hall (1999)

case study

global

power sector
indicators

multicountry

reforms have
coincided with rising
power cuts and
blackouts

Erdogdu
(2013)

econometric

global

panel data: 27
countries, 19742008

fixed
effects;
random
effects

reform progress led to
decline in R&D
investments

Prasad
(2008)

case study

Africa

energy sector
indicators

multicountry

energy reforms only
impacts access when
adjusted to local
conditions of the poor
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Kozulj and
Sbroiavacca
(2004)

case study

Latin
America

power sector
indicators

multicountry

electrification levels
increased after
reforms

3.1.3. Impacts of reforms on productivity and economic efficiency4
The changes in energy market structures together with changes in the role of the state and
regulation of the sector were aimed at improving utility efficiency and productivity levels
through the introduction of market competition (Wolfram, 1999). The evidence of reforms in
improving efficiency and productivity in the electricity sector is positive especially in Latin
America, which also remains the most studied region. However, efficiency and productivity
impacts of reforms remain least studied in South Asia and Africa. There are only few studies
analyzing utility efficiency and reforms at the global levels.
An earlier study by Yunos and Hawdon (1997) found that changes in ownership did not
automatically resolve efficiency problems in the absence of competition among the least
developed countries where significant efficiency gaps persisted between small scale and largescale electricity providers. Rodriguez-Pardina and Rossi (2000) finds some evidence that
suggest that countries, which reformed their electricity sector, had a better performance than
those, which did not. Although technical efficiency among the major electricity distribution
companies in South America marginally improved between 1994 and 2001, the results
suggested considerable scope for improving efficiency among the firms (Estache, Rossi and
Ruzzier, 2004). The increments in productivity seem to be in line with the degree of incentives
built in regulation while private companies under rate of return regulation exhibited similar
labor productivity as public firms (Estache and Rossi, 2005).
The labor productivity in the electricity distribution experienced an increase after reforms in
Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). Labor productivity in electricity distribution also increased in Chile
since the privatisation of leading companies (Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra, 2003). The
incorporation of distribution value added (VAD) in the tariff fixation processes of the electrical
power distribution contributed to driving the efficiency of the distribution sector in Chile
(Sanhueza, Rudnick and Lagunas, 2004). In Brazil, privatisation had no statistically significant
4

Economic efficiency is a combination of technical and allocative efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). Firms operating
on the production frontier are said to be technically efficient while allocative efficiency in input selection imply
selecting that mix of inputs (such as labor and capital) that produces a given quantity of output at minimum cost
(given the input prices which prevail). Productivity of a firm is the ratio of the output(s) that it produces to the
input(s) that it uses.
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impact with operating expenditures as input but technically efficiency dropped when
considering total expenditures (Motta, 2004). This makes case for including capital costs in
any benchmarking exercise. Overall, the reform processes as well as the incentives generated
in the reform process in Brazil do not seem to have led the firms to behave in a more efficient
manner between 1998 and 2005 (Ramos-Real et al., 2009).
Bonifaz and Santin (2000) found out that privatised firms did not outperform state enterprises
arguing that privatisation did not lead to an improvement in terms of efficiency among Peruvian
electricity distribution companies. The post reform experience suggested insufficient evidence
for technical change or significant savings associated with technological improvements in the
sector (Bonifaz and Rodriguez, 2001). Improvements in efficiency and productivity of
electricity distribution in Peru have occurred with the adoption of regulatory reforms in the
Peruvian electricity sector although privatisation proved to be advantageous only in the initial
years after the reform (Perez-Reyes and Tovar, 2010). There seem to be a positive relationship
between the restructuring and reforms of the electricity distribution sector and enhancement of
productivity in Peru (Perez-Reyes and Tovar, 2009). Management practices seem to be
important in the Peruvian electricity distribution due to which private utilities are less
inefficient than public utilities (Bonifaz and Jaramillo, 2010).
In Colombia, reforms of the 1990s seem to have improved the average efficiency levels of
electricity distribution with regulatory policy engendering a positive effect while ownership
has produced no conclusive effect (Pombo and Ramirez, 2002a). Technological improvements
and regulatory policy have had a positive effect on average efficiency but the divide between
good performers and bad performers increased after reforms (Pombo and Ramirez, 2002b).
Mello and Espinoza (2004) found no significant changes in the productivity levels among the
20 distribution companies between 1993 and 2003, although environmental variables mattered
significantly. In contrast, Pombo and Taborda (2006) showed that plant efficiency and
productivity increased after the regulatory reform of 1994 although the efficiency of
distribution companies did not improve after the reforms. Nonetheless, the Colombian
electricity distribution exhibits high inefficiency persistence and heterogeneity among firms
(Galan and Pollitt, 2014). Rural companies and firms with small customers seem to have
experienced the largest efficiency gains over the 15 years after the reforms.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the results obtained from the efficiency analysis of the Côte d’voire
electricity companies could not reject the hypothesis of a significant performance improvement
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in post-privatization period while the technical efficiency measures have behaved irregularly
since privatization (Plane, 1999). Meanwhile, Estache et al. (2008) attempted at documenting
efficiency levels in Africa's electricity firms based on a sample of 12 operators providing
services in the 12 country members of the Southern Africa Power Pool. The study relied on the
DEA decomposition technique to estimate the changes in total factor productivity (TFP). The
results showed comparable levels of efficiency and performance levels in the region while
finding no clear correlation of efficiency improvements with the adoption of reforms.
A number of studies have focused on efficiency and productivity analysis of electricity reforms
in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. The efficiency analysis based on the Ukrainian
privately and publicly-owned electricity distribution firms in the context of a new regulatory
authority and distribution utility privatisations suggested that privately-owned firms responded
to policies and incentives associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network
losses than publicly owned firms (Berg et al., 2005). In Poland, technical efficiency among the
electricity distribution companies increased during the transition process while allocative
efficiency deteriorated (Cullman and von Hirschhausen, 2008a). The cross-country level
analysis suggested that the Polish ddistribution companies were marginally inefficient while
the Czech Republic featured the highest efficiency (Cullman and von Hirschhausen, 2008b).
Slovakia and Hungary occupied the middle range. This implies that privatization had a positive
effect on technical efficiency in all four countries. The average efficiency of thermal generation
plants also grew in China as autonomy from the central government was one of the important
determinants of efficiency (Lam and Shiu, 2004). In Turkey, private distributors had better
technical scale efficiency on average during the early years of reforms (Bagdadioglu et al.,
1996; Celen, 2013).
A limited number of studies have been carried out to assess the efficiency and productivity of
electricity reforms in developing Asian countries. The performance and efficiency analysis of
Indian electricity generation companies supported the policy of unbundling the power sector
while state owned companies appeared inefficient (Jain et al., 2010). However, privatisation
brought about different impacts among employees productivity in the state of Orissa as some
employees felt benefits while others did not (Kundu and Mishra, 2012). In contrast, technical
performance in the Thai electricity industry was found to be mainly driven by technological
and productivity improvements (Wattana and Sharma, 2011). In the Philippines, productivity
in the sector did not improve significantly despite reforms being instituted in 2001 (Bautista et
al., 2011). Similarly, the empirical analysis by Nakano and Managi (2008) showed that
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regulatory reforms have contributed to productivity growth in steam power-generation sector
in Japan for the period 1978-2003. Deregulation of the Japanese power industry also
contributed to productivity growth (Goto and Sueyoshi, 2009). In China, unbundling of the
integrated electricity utility-the State Power Corporation (SPC) improved productivity and
operational efficiency among the large coal-fired power plants controlling for substantial
heterogeneity in the technical profile of the plants (Zhao and Ma, 2013).

Table 6: Reforms and Efficiency and Productivity
Study

Approach

Region

Data

Method

Policy impacts
and relevance

Pollitt
(1995)

nonparametric

global

768 thermal
plants from 14
countries
including South
Africa and
Thailand

DEA with 2nd
stage
regressions
/Tobit

privatisation did
not lower costs in
the short run,
government
interference with
investment
increase costs

Yunos and
Hawdon
(1997)

nonparametric

least
developing
countries

cross-section
generation data
for 27 countries,
panel of
electricity
generating
utilities from
Malaysia,
Thailand and the
UK for 19751990

DEA

changes in
ownership do not
resolve efficiency
problems in the
absence of
competition,
efficiency gaps
between small
scale and large
scale providers

RodriguezPardina and
Rossi (2000)

parametric

South
America

30 electricity
distribution
companies from
10 countries
1994-1998

stochastic
production
function

partial evidence of
reformers
performing better
than nonreformers

Estache,
Rossi and
Ruzzier
(2004)

parametric/
nonparametric

Latin
America

84 electricity
distribution
companies 19942001

stochastic cost
function,
DEA, labor
requirement
function

technical
efficiency
marginally
improved but
scope for
efficiency
improvement
exists

Estache and
Rossi (2005)

parametric

Latin
America

127 distribution
companies 19942001

stochastic
production
function/labor

incentives in
embedded in
regulation crucial
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requirement
function

for productivity
increases

ESMAP
(2011)

parametric

global

distribution
companies from
20 countries with
different system
sizes

fixed effects;
random effects

Introduction of
independent
regulator increased
labor productivity
by twice as high as
systems that have
introduced
regulation

Sanhueza,
Rudnick and
Lagunas
(2004)

nonparametric

Chile

35 distribution
companies for the
year 2000

DEA

incorporating
distribution VAD
led to
improvements in
efficiency

Malik et al.
(2015)

parametric

India

unbalanced panel
of 385 electricity
generating units
for the years
1998-2009

panel data
econometric
based in fixed
effects

states unbundling
before the
Electricity Act of
2003 experienced
improvements in
operational
efficiency
especially after 3-5
years after
unbundling

Motta (2004) parametric/
nonparametric

Brazil

distribution
companies 1994
and 2000

DEA/Stochasti
c production
frontier

Privatisation has
no effect on
operating cost
efficiency, makes
case for including
capital costs in
benchmarking

Ramos-Real
et al. (2009)

nonparametric

Brazil

panel of 18
distribution
companies from
1998-2005

DEA

incentives
generated in the
reforms process
incapable of
making firms
behave in more
efficient manner

Bonifaz and
Santin
(2000)

nonparametric

Peru

panel of 19
distribution
operators 19951998

DEA with 2nd
stage
regressions

privatisation did
not lead to an
improvement in
terms of efficiency

Bonifaz and
Jaramillo
(2010)

parametric

Peru

panel of 19
distribution
companies for the
period 2000-2008

stochastic cost
frontier

private utilities are
less inefficient
than public
utilities due to
better management
practices
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Perez-Reyes
and Tovar
(2009)

nonparametric

Peru

14 distribution
companies for the
period 1996-2006

DEA

reforms led to
improvements in
efficiency and
productivity

Perez-Reyes
and Tovar
(2010)

parametric

Peru

14 distribution
companies
between 1996 and
2006

distance
function

incentives lead by
the reform process
made firms more
efficient

Pombo and
Ramirez
(2002a)

nonparametric

Colombia

panel of 33
distribution
companies from
1988-2000

DEA with 2nd
stage
regression

reforms improved
average efficiency
levels

Pombo and
Ramirez
(2002b)

nonparametric

Colombia

panel of 33
generation and 12
distribution
companies 19882000

DEA with 2nd
stage
regression

technology
improvements and
regulatory policy
had positive effect
on average
efficiency levels

Mello and
Espinoza
(2004)

parametric

Colombia

panel of 20
distribution
companies 19992003

Free Disposal
Hull (FDH)

environmental
variables mattered
significantly

Galan and
Pollitt
(2014)

parametric

Colombia

panel of 21
electricity
distribution firms
for the period
1998-2012

dynamic SFA
model

increases in
efficiency among
rural firms only
manifested during
the last five years
driven by
improvements in
service quality and
energy losses
occured

Plane (1999)

parametric

Côte
d’Ivoire

time-series from
1959-1995

stochastic
production
function

significant but
irregular gains
from the
privatization of
management

Estache,
Tovar and
Trujillo
(2008)

nonparametric

Southern
African
countries

12 operators of 12
different
countries, 19982005

DEA

no clear
correlation
between between
adoption of
reforms and
improvements in
efficiency

Berg, Lin
and Tsaplin
(2005)

parametric/
nonparametric

Ukraine

24 distribution
companies, 19982002

stochastic
production
frontier/DEA

private operators
responded well to
incentives than
public operators,
perverse
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regulation worsens
incentives
Cullman and
von
Hirschhause
n (2008a)

parametric/
nonparametric

Poland

32 distribution
companies
between 1997 to
2002

DEA/SFA

technical
efficiency
improved with
reforms but
allocative
efficiency
deteriorated

Cullman and
von
Hirschhause
n (2008b)

nonparametric

Poland,
Czech
Republic,
Slovakia,
Hungary

47 Eastern
European regional
companies, 37
German
companies

DEA/Free
Disposal Hall

Czech Republic
and Slovakia
feature the highest
efficiency,
privatisation had a
positive effect in
all countries

Lam and
Shiu (2004)

nonparametric

China

panel of 30
municipal
autonomous
regions and
provincial thermal
generation plants
1995-1996

DEA with 2nd
stage
regressions

average efficiency
increased at 2%

Bagdadioglu
, Price and
Weyman
Jones (1996)

nonparametric

Turkey

cross section of
70 distribution
operators in 1991

DEA

Private operators
are more efficient
than public
operators

Celen (2013)

nonparametric

Turkey

21 companies for
the period 20022009

DEA with 2nd
stage
regression/Tob
it

private ownership
positively affect
efficiencies

Jain, Thakur
and
Shandilya
(2010)

parametric/
nonparametric

India

30 state –owned
utilities for the
year 2007-2008

DEA/SFA

unbundling drives
efficiency in
electricity
generation

Wattana and
Sharma
(2011)

nonparametric

Thailand

Thai electric
industry, time
series data from
1980-2006

DEA

industry reforms
not significant in
driving efficiency

Bautista,
Agnes and
Valderrama
(2011)

nonparametric

Philippines

120 electric
cooperatives,
2001 to 2006

DEA

reforms did not
drive productivity
in the sector

Nakano and
Managi
(2008)

parametric/
nonparametric

Japan

10 companies,
1965-2003

DEA/
generalised
method of
moments

regulatory reforms
have contributed
to productivity
growth in the
steam powergeneration
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Goto and
Sueyoshi
(2009)

parametric

Japan

annual
observations in 9
companies from
1983-2003

multi-product
translog cost
function,
random effects
maximum
likelihood
estimator

improvements in
productivity
growth after
deregulation

Pombo and
Taborda
(2006)

nonparametric

Colombia

12 electricity
distribution
companies from
1985 to 2001

DEA

Zhao and
Ma (2013)

nonparametric

China

balanced panel:
34 large power
plants for the
period 1997-2010

DEA

profitability,
partial input
productivity, and
output improved;
plant efficiency
and productivity
increased after the
reform
Operation
efficiency
improved on
average,
unbundling
boosted
productivity

3.2. Macroeconomic Impacts of Electricity Sector Reforms
In this section, we review the relevant literature analyzing the impacts of electricity sector
reforms on macroeconomic indicators such as economic welfare, economic growth and poverty
reduction. Electricity is one of the main inputs to economic growth especially in developing
countries where economic development is constraint due to lack of infrastructure including
reliable supply of electricity. Therefore, any programs and policies that relax the electricity
supply constraints are expected to generate positive impacts on economic welfare and growth
and also reduce poverty. In this section we present some evidence to support this argument.
3.2.1. Impacts of reforms on economic welfare
The economy-wide welfare impacts of power sector reforms are reported by a few studies.
Galal et al. (1994) that estimated the welfare impacts of the privatisation of the Chilean
distribution and generation companies, is one of the first and most comprehensive studies
assessing welfare implications of power sector reforms. The privatisation of the Chilean
electricity companies (an electricity distribution and a power generation) led to a permanent
gain in social welfare equivalent to 2.1% of 1986 sales value. However, the gains were achieved
at a fiscal loss and two-thirds of the aggregate gains went to foreign shareholders. In Brazil,
the privatization of the electricity distribution during the period 1995-2000 when
31

approximately 60% of privatisation occurred created a one-off gain equal to 2.5% of the GDP
while producers gain around two-thirds of the benefits (Mota, 2003). Consumers could have
benefited more from privatization since the start the presence of tougher regulation. The
economic welfare impacts of partial privatization and restructuring of the Peruvian electricity
market also proved worthwhile as the gains amounted to 542 million US dollars in 2007 prices
(Anaya, 2010). The distributional gains suggested that government and producers benefited the
most from welfare gains while consumers benefited the least.
Toba (2007) studied the welfare impacts of introduction of private sector participation into the
Philippine electricity generation sector, through liberalization of the market for IPPs during the
power crisis of 1990-1993. The introduction of IPPs presented significant gains contributing to
resolving the crisis and promoting economic and social development while consumers and
investors were net gainers. However, only about one-quarter of the total private investors’ gain
is transferred to the domestic investors, as most of the investors are assumed to be foreigners.
The largest portion of the net benefit equivalent to a net present value of 10.4 billion US dollars
(in 1999 prices) was distributed to consumers while both domestic and foreign investors also
gained. The government was the loser. In Israel, Tisher et al. (2006) undertook a cost-benefit
analysis summarizing the government's reform plan using an unregulated regime as the
counterfactual. The results suggested that the government's reform plan would only yield a
small net benefit even when carried out flawlessly relative to the regulated regime. The reforms
will also lead to large increases in electricity producer profit and government tax receipts at the
expense of the electricity consumers. As such, a less-than-perfect transition to competition
could easily preclude the potential gain of the government plan.

Table 7: Reforms and Economic Welfare
Study
Galal et al.
(1994)

Approach
multicountry case
studies

Region
global

Data
public
enterprises
divestitures in
UK, Chile,
Malaysia and
Mexico; analyses
the privatisation
of the power
sector in Chile
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Method
social costbenefit
analysis

Policy impacts and
relevance
privatisation when
combined with
proper regulatory
framework can be
welfare enhancing,
private ownership
improves efficiency
of generation,
promote profit

maximisation and
increases the value of
regulation
Mota (2003)

single
country case
study

Brazil

privatisation of
electricity
distribution and
supply
businesses
between 19952000

social costbenefit
analysis

economic welfare
(net benefits) was
significant but most
of it went to the
producers;
consumers could
have benefited more
from privatisation in
the presence of
tougher regulation

Anaya
(2010)

single
country case
study

Peru

privatisation of
electricity
distribution
companies:
Electrolima and
Electro Sur
Medio

social costbenefit
analysis

privatisation was
worthwhile in terms
of social welfare,
government and
producers benefited
the most while
consumers the least
due to price increases

Toba (2007)

single
country case
study

Philippines liberalisation of
the electricity
generation sector
between 19901993

social costbenefit
analysis

consumers and
investors were net
gainers while the
government lost,
reform with private
sector participation
increased economic
welfare

Tishler et al.
(2006)

single
country case
study

Israel

cost-benefit
analysis

the reform plan will
only yield a small net
benefit even when
carried out
flawlessly, will
increase the profit for
producers and tax
receipts for the
government at the
expense of
customers,
performance-based
regulation of the
sector thereby is
desirable

in accordance to
the 2003 Israeli
government
announcement to
undertake a
comprehensive
reform of the
electricity sector
based on the
standard reform
model
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3.2.2. Impacts of reforms on economic growth
A few studies have provided evidence of positive impacts of power sector reforms on economic
growth. For example, Sen and Jamasb (2012) empirically show the increased stock of
electricity infrastructure has made a significant contribution to its industrial economic output
Existing literature such as Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and
Robinson (2010) also establish the positive relationship between stock (as well as quality) of
infrastructure and per capita GDP growth.
Empirical evidence also suggests a strong positive link between regulatory quality in all
economic sectors and economic performance such as economic growth in developing countries
(Jalilian, Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2007). Electricity reforms can stimulate economic growth by
improving access to electricity and electricity consumption (Ozturk, 2010). However, only a
few studies have directly examined whether energy sector reforms serve as the determinants of
economic growth where per capita GDP and overall employment are used as an indicators of
economic growth.
Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) examined the impact of power sector reforms on per capita GDP in
the transition countries which predominantly includes countries belonging to the Former Soviet
Union. The empirical results show significant positive impacts of reforms on GDP. The results
also hold for the growing Indian economy as evidenced from the empirical results by Sen and
Jamasb (2012). Their study econometrically analyzed the determinants and impact of
electricity reform in the Indian states, giving special regard to its political economy and
regional diversity.
Chisari et al. (1999) estimated the macroeconomic effects of the privatisation and regulation of
utilities including the energy sector that began since 1989 in Argentina. The privatization of
electricity generation and distribution and gas all had positive effect on GDP. The privatisation
of the gas sector had the greatest effect on GDP amounting to 0.31% rise in GDP in the presence
of good regulation. Privatization of energy utilities did not contribute to the dramatic rise in
unemployment between 1993 and 1995. The fiscal consequences of privatization and
regulation of infrastructure utilities including energy suggested that the country gained more
in macroeconomic terms from the net present value of subsidy cuts (Benitez et al., 2001).
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Reallocating the resources freed up by energy subsidies removal to more productive public
spending can help boost economic growth over the long run (IMF, 2013)
Table 8: Reforms and Economic Growth
Study

Approach

Region

Data

Method

Policy impacts and
relevance

Chisari,
Estache and
Romero
(1999)

macro study

Argentina

performance
data before and
after
privatisation of
the argentine
utilities

CGE model

privatisation resulted in
different kinds of
efficiency gains with
significant macroeconomic benefits,
privatisation not the
cause for rising
unemployment

IMF (2013)

case study

global

energy and
economy level
data

multicountry

subsidies removal boost
economic growth in the
long run

Benitez,
Chisari and
Estache
(2001)

macro study

Argentina

privatisation,
fiscal reforms
and regulation
data

CGE

country gained more
from subsidy cuts and
reforms and
privatisation of energy
utilities not responsible
for increased
unemployment

Nepal and
Jamasb
(2012a)

econometric transition panel data: 27
economies countries, 19902010

bias
corrected
fixed effects

power sector reform on
its own did not produce
any significant impacts
on T&D losses

Sen and
Jamasb
(2012)

econometric India

bias
corrected
fixed effects

reforms positively
affected the GDP

panel data: 19
Indian states,
1991-2007

3.2.3. Impacts of reforms on poverty alleviation
Existing literature on infrastructure reforms and poverty linkages shows that policy changes to
improve the access and quality of infrastructure services help reduce poverty through direct
and indirect channels, such as providing more opportunities to generate income, improving
health and educational outcomes (Estache and Fay, 1995; Brenneman and Kerf, 2002). Hence,
power sector reforms aimed at improving the access and supply reliability contributes to
poverty reduction. However, existing studies have not empirically examined this issue and
explored the evidence to investigate this hypothesis. In fact, some studies examining this issue
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empirically (e.g., Victor, 2005) found no inherent connection between energy markets reforms
and the promotion of welfare for the poorest households although energy consumption and
economic growth are correlated.
The extent to which power sector reform affects poor people primarily depends on their ability
to access electricity. For example, energy poor also tend to be income poor as evidenced from
India establishing a clear link between income poverty and energy poverty (Khandker, Barnes,
Samad, 2012a). Rural electrification also helped reduce poverty in India even though the larger
share of benefits accrued to wealthier rural households (Khandker et al., 2012). In addition,
grid electrification in Bangladesh generated significant positive impacts on household income,
expenditure and education where the household gain in total income due to electrification was
around 21%, with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in poverty per year (Khandker et al., 2012b).
Similarly, access to communal grid electricity generated externality benefits for the poor than
the rich in Vietnam while access to household electricity benefited the rich than poor
questioning the rural electrification’s long term benefits for the overall rural economy
(Khandker, Barnes and Samad, 2013).
The efficiency gains from privatization of energy utilities in Argentina accrued mostly to highincome classes, while gains from the effective regulation of newly privatized utilities accrued
mainly to low-income classes (Chisari et al., 1999). All income groups benefited from reforms
while the distribution of income also improved (Navajas, 2000). In general, incidences of final
electricity price fall were experienced post reforms in Latin America although the price fall did
not translate into increased affordability and access to electricity to the poor households. The
electric utilities and the governments shared most of the gains in the form of rents and higher
tax revenue (Estache and Rossi, 2004). In Peru, electricity consumers, which constitute the
majority of the population, benefited the least from reforms as welfare gains were offset by
increases in prices (Anaya, 2010). Nonetheless, the welfare consequences of getting connected
to electricity networks are high.
Some studies have examined distributional impacts of some components of power sector
reforms, such as electricity pricing reforms. Boccanfuso et al. (2009a) assess the distributional
effects of electricity pricing reform in Senegal. The analysis found that increases in electricity
prices bear little direct impact on most poor households as only few poor households are
connected to network. Compensating measures such as cash transfers in the face of electricity
price increase slightly decreases income inequality between poor and rich households. Similar
effects were observed regarding the distributional and poverty-related effects of price reform
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in the electricity sector of Mali, a poor country in West Africa (Boccanfuso et al., 2009b). The
increase in electricity prices did not affect poverty directly as very few poor households are
connected to the electricity grid while households also decrease their electricity consumption
when price rises. Unlike in Senegal, compensating measures such as cash transfer after price
rise did not help the low-income households losing from pricing reform. Based on the broad
trends of energy reforms across the African countries, Clark et al. (2005) show that the impacts
of reforms on the poor are neither direct nor inevitable.

Table 9: Reforms and Poverty Reduction
Study

Approach

Region

Data

Method

Policy impacts and
relevance

Victor
(2005)

case study

global

energy sector
indicators

multicountry

energy access and
development correlated;
link between reforms and
poverty reduction
complex and noninherent

Khandker,
Barnes and
Samad
(2012a)

econometric

India

cross-sectional
survey data for
households in
2005

probit
estimates

energy poverty and
income poverty are
directly linked to each
other

Khandker,
Barnes and
Samad
(2012b)

econometric

Bangladesh

cross-sectional
survey data for
households in
2005

propensit
y score
matching

electrification led to
household gains in
income and poverty
reduction

Khandker et
al. (2012)

econometric

India

cross-sectional
survey data for
households in
2005

maximum
likelihood
probit
model

rural electrification also
helped reduce poverty;
larger share of benefits
accrued to wealthier rural
households

Boccanfuso,
Estache and
Savard
(2009a)

macro study

Senegal

macro –micro
variables
between 1995
to 2001

CGE
model

direct price effects are
weaker than general
equilibrium effects on
poverty and inequality

Boccanfuso,
Estache and
Savard
(2009b)

macro study

Mali

macro –micro
variables

CGE
model

direct price increases
have a minimal effect on
poverty and inequality,
whereas the general
equilibrium effects of
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such increases are quite
strong and negative
Clark et al.
(2005)

case study

Africa

energy sector
indicators,
macro
variables

multicountry

impacts of reforms on
the poor are neither
direct nor inevitable

Betily,
Movchan
and
Pugachov
(2013

macro study

Ukraine

household
survey data for
2009

CGE
model

increases in gas prices
result in welfare losses
across all household
categories, with a more
profound impact on
urban households

Solaymani,
Kari and
Zakaria(201
3)

macro study

Malaysia

time series
macro and
micro data

CGE
model

subsidy removal can
potentially lead to
significant falls in
income of rural
households leading to
rising poverty levels
among the rural
households

ADB (2005)

case study

Asia

macro-micro
data

multicountry

strong links between
investments in energy
infrastructure and rural
poverty reduction in
Thailand and India

Estache,
Foster and
Wodon
(2002)

case study

Latin
America

macro-micro
variables

multicountry

evidence of reforms on
poverty reduction is
scarce; hence the
analysis remain
incomplete

4. Discussions and Policy Implications
A review of the limited literature and evidence on the impacts of electricity sector reforms
suggests a growing trend in this research area among the developing and transition countries.
The existing reform studies have used both quantitative and qualitative techniques to assess the
impact of reforms with no strict preference over one another. Latin America remains the most
studied region in the reform literature for two major reasons: a) being one of the pioneers of
the market-driven electricity reforms and b) the ability of the Latin American Association of
Energy Regulators to generate comparable data.
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The reform studies have analysed one or many dimensions of reforms involving changes in
electricity market structures, regulation of the sector and changing role of the state on several
industry specific micro and economy specific macro variables. The evidence on the
performance of reforms remains mixed in developing countries for varied reasons. For
example, the mixed results indicate that reforms have not progressed, stalled or recently
initiated to produce the intended economic effects in many developing countries. Additionally,
even if reforms have advanced, they remain so only in theory such that existing reform practices
are incapable of producing real impacts. The reform measures among selective samples may
also be inadequate to recognize significant effects while undertaking quantitative (mostly
econometric) studies.
Moreover, the mixed results and evidence also reflect the difficulty of undertaking any
empirical studies on the performance and determinants of electricity reforms. The reliability of
econometric results analysing the effects of reforms often hinges on the availability of a data
sample that captures a mix of reform experiences. Electricity reforms and performance data
tend to suffer from endogeneity and simultaneity bias. Establishing the effects of reforms
typically involve correcting for country or utility specific factors other than reforms but robust
evidences are neither guaranteed nor certain. This is because of reforms being multidimensional involves a number of simultaneous inter-related steps affected by a vector of
political, economic and institutional factors that are difficult to quantify. These factors make it
difficult to isolate the effects of particular reform steps or interaction of different reform steps
on specific reform outcomes.
The issue of cost-reflective pricing remains at the heart of the success or failure of the reforms.
Reforms led to cost-reflective electricity pricing in some countries in Latin America by
decreasing the price-cost margin. In the absence of market power abuse and exercise, reforms
also led a decline in average wholesale electricity prices but not necessarily the retail prices.
Privatization, however, raised the electricity prices allowing the governments and producers to
gain from the price rise while affecting the consumers. The existence of an independent
regulator and institutional quality seem to facilitate the transition to cost-reflective power
pricing and mitigate adverse impacts of price increases. Hence, electricity price adjustments
should be undertaken before privatization rather than after privatization to minimize the
tension between economic efficiency and equity if privatization of the energy companies is
considered as an option for reform in developing countries. The existence of cross-subsidies
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and subsidies for rural electrification in developing countries implies that it is also hard to
separate the price only impacts of reforms.
In many developing countries, reforms have led to improvements in operational efficiency of
the sector by minimizing energy losses, increasing energy production and energy capacities.
For example, the liberalized electricity market model in South America has been relatively
successful in attracting investments in generation than the dominant single-buyer model in
South Asia. However, power theft still remains common in developing and transition countries
despite reforms. This implies that establishing social legitimacy and public acceptance of
reforms are crucial in tackling the traditional problems of non-commercial energy losses
(energy theft) and non-payment of energy in developing countries. One possible way to
increase the social legitimacy and public acceptance of reforms is by implementing reform
programs that adequately reflect the local economic, political and social conditions rather than
solely relying on international reform ideologies.
The issue of service quality is mostly associated with the access to energy in developing
countries with reforms generating varying impacts. For example, the adoption of market-based
reforms in Latin America coincided with an expansion in rural electricity access programs as
opposed to countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa where the lack of electricity access
in rural areas remains a national problem. In contrast, South Africa achieved higher
electrification without implementing the textbook reform model. The evidence suggests that
reforms, if undertaken, alone cannot solve the problems of inadequate access to electricity
in developing countries in the absence of other complementary socio-economic
arrangements. The existence of side arrangements implies that it is hard to measure the direct
impacts of reforms on rural electricity access. Nonetheless, reforms have helped exposing the
issue of inadequate rural energy access as major impediments to socio-economic progress in
developing countries.
Reforms (mainly privatization and regulation) seem to have largely improved the cost
efficiency of electricity utilities in many developing countries. Energy sectors in these countries
witnessed major efficiency gains. In that sense, reforms seem to have fulfilled one of its major
objectives. However, the gains have not trickled down to the end-users of energy. Evidence
suggests that consumers benefited from efficiency gains from privatization in the presence of
a good regulatory body while regulators with perverse incentives exacerbated the matter. The
inability of the sector regulators to transfer the efficiency gains achieved through reforms to
end users through market-based instruments (such as incentive regulation) has led to reforms
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being unpopular and negative.

From a consumer-welfare perspective, the lessons of

experience suggest the need to create an independent and competent regulatory body before
privatization of electricity utilities.
Reforms, if carried out properly, enhance economic welfare as documented from the lessons
of experience. However, reforms alone are incapable of creating an equitable distribution of
welfare among different income groups. The welfare gains from privatization mostly went to
both domestic and foreign-owned producers in many instances. Experiences document that the
welfare gains from privatisation would have benefited consumers more in the presence of a
tougher regulation. The importance of a proper regulatory framework in maintaining a
balance between welfare maximization and equity considerations is paramount in developing
countries.
The impact of electricity sector reforms on economic growth is positive. This is not surprising
when macroeconomic conditions have often catapulted energy reform in many developing
countries. Privatization, if pursued with economic motives, seems to be conducive in
macroeconomic terms. However, removal of energy subsidies seems to generate contractionary
effects on the economy in the short-run although the long-term effects are positive. Hence,
energy subsidies reform in developing countries should be appropriately phased, well
targeted and transparent while the corresponding prices increases should be sequential and
not abrupt to maintain economic growth both in the short-term and long run.
The link between electricity sector reforms and poverty reduction remain in-direct, complex
and hard to quantify. Evidence suggests a correlation between electricity access and
development in developing countries implying that reforms affect poverty in developing
countries through access to electricity. For example, the access to electricity in rural
Bangladesh increased the welfare of the poor and helped reduce poverty as well. This implies
that at a minimum, reforms should be aimed at catering the electricity to the poor to produce
any significant impacts on poverty reduction in developing countries. This indeed is a major
challenge considering the costs involved in expanding energy access. For example, it is
estimated that the investment cost of providing electricity to Sub-Saharan Africa over a 10year period is between 160 billion and 215 billion U.S. dollars (Rosnes and Vennemo, 2012).
At the same time, it also provides an opportunity to reform the lives of the poor and establish
the legacy of market driven reforms in developing countries.
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5. Conclusions
This paper reviewed the empirical and theoretical literature on the linkages between electricity
reforms; economic and technical efficiency, operational performance, economic growth,
economic welfare and poverty reduction in developing countries. The paper achieved this by
understanding the context and motivation of energy reforms, reviewing the progress and
assessing the factors that shaped the outcomes of reforms, measuring reform performance,
exploring the theory and practice of electricity reforms and formulating policy lessons based
on the performance of reforms in developing countries. The extent of reforms has varied across
developing countries in terms of changes in market structures, the role of the state and the
regulation of the sector.
Existing literature suggests that assessing the impacts of electricity reforms has heavily
focussed on measuring the operational and economic efficiency and productivity impacts of
the reforms. However, the literature studying the macro linkages of the reforms seems scarce.
The impact of reforms on the poor is also limited and hard to quantify. Hence, examining the
impact of power sector reforms on factors directly affecting poor people was a challenge of the
study. The incompleteness of reforms and the interplay among several indirect factors (such as
economic, political and institutional) compounds the challenge of properly measuring the
reform impacts of individual reform steps.
Overall, from the literature, it is evident that reforms have improved the efficiency and
productivity in the sector, although the efficiency gains may not always reach the end
consumers. The existence of an independent regulatory body with tougher regulation is
necessary in developing countries to transfer the efficiency gains to the customers and ensure
that not only producers and the government benefit from privatization. Reforms seem to
generate poverty alleviation impacts only when the poor have access to electricity. This implies
that reforms should be localized with a view to meet the electricity needs of the poor, which
can potentially enhance the welfare of the poor. However, there is a consensus in the literature
that the regulatory framework at disposal and the nature of regulation are crucial in balancing
the tension between economic efficiency and equity impacts of reforms.
We also found several caveats in the existing reform literature, which future research can
potentially address. The welfare analysis of reforms using cost-benefit analysis remains limited
in the context of developing countries. The impacts of reforms on electricity network
investments are also unclear and under-studied. The competitiveness of wholesale markets and
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market power issues also remain to be studied in developing countries in the aftermath of
reforms. The existing literature on the empirical evidence of reforms focuses mostly on the
electricity sector. Similar studies should be extended to other energy sectors such as coal, oil
and gas by facilitating information and data sharing among the energy regulators.
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